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Biological Weapons Convention  
Meeting of Experts 
NGO Statements 
4-8 August 2014  
 
 
Mr Chairman: 
  
The University of London∗ greatly appreciates the opportunity to address this Meeting 
of Experts. 
  
Yesterday, here in Geneva, King’s College London in partnership with the Geneva 
Centre for Security Policy convened a one-day workshop on confidence and 
compliance with the BWC.  The workshop was organised around three core 
questions:  To what extent is the BWC verifiable?  Do the CBMs build confidence?  
What would a legally-binding mechanism look like today?  The aim of the workshop 
was to enable an informal exchange of views in preparation for the Eighth Review 
Conference.  A report of the workshop will be launched at the Meeting of States 
Parties in December.  We are grateful to the Foreign & Commonwealth Office of the 
United Kingdom for financial support of our work. 
  
Our statement today addresses standing agenda items 2 and 3. 
  
  
Standing Agenda Item 2: Review of Developments in Science and Technology 
  
On Wednesday 6 August we will be launching a report on Synthetic Biology and 
Biosecurity by King’s College London researchers in a side-event showcasing 
developments in science and technology relevant to the BWC.  This side-event is co-
sponsored by the US National Academy of Sciences, the Royal Society, the 
International Union of Microbiological Societies, the Inter-Academies Panel, UNIDIR 
and King’s College London.  In addition to a presentation of our report on Synthetic 
Biology and Biosecurity it will also feature talks on microbial forensics and 
pathogenicity.  You are all warmly invited to attend. 
  
We are pleased to note that our report has proved useful to the Implementation 
Support Unit in its preparation of the background document for this Meeting of 
Experts reviewing developments in science and technology, and that it is cited as 
part of the key material for the newly identified trend on tacit knowledge along with a 
second article co-authored by a King’s College London researcher. 
  
  
Standing Agenda Item 3: Strengthening National Implementation 
  
This is the third year that Strengthening National Implementation has been a 
standing agenda item and at this stage in the Intersessional Programme a clear 
consensus should be emerging on the way forward.  Recommendations need to be 
agreed in good time for the Eighth Review Conference.  We offer three guidelines: 
  
1. National implementation needs strengthening in prevention as well as prohibition, 
in practice as well as on paper, since both prohibition and prevention are specified in 
the stringent requirements of Article IV.  This prevention criterion must always be 
kept in view. 
  
2. National implementation needs to be sufficiently transparent to build confidence in 
compliance, so we welcome the call for a focused discussion of what constitutes 
compliance and how a State Party can best demonstrate its own compliance.  Such 
a discussion fits well within this standing agenda item, and should help shape its 
outcome in recommendations to the Review Conference. 
  
3. Each State Party implements Article IV in accordance with its own constitutional 
processes, and each must decide for itself what method will best demonstrate its 
own compliance.  Several have already pioneered distinct approaches, such as peer 
review and compliance assessment.  Others should follow such examples or come 
up with their own alternative means of reassurance.  No one is making exclusive 
claims for their particular approach, so it remains wide open to every State Party to 
choose its own way of shaping its national implementation so as to demonstrate 
compliance.  We encourage everyone to take initiatives and, in the words of this 
agenda item, share best practices and experiences. 
  
The important thing is that States Parties recognise their responsibility as treaty 
partners to find ways of reassuring one another that they are indeed fulfilling their 
treaty obligations and are seen to do so. 
  
Strengthening National Implementation is thus integrally related to the demonstration 
of compliance.  This standing agenda item will have enriched the Intersessional 
Programme if it feeds into the Review Conference a common understanding to that 
effect and a set of recommendations to promote this vital aspect of the BWC treaty 
regime. 
  
Conclusion 
  
Mr Chairman: 
  
This treaty regime will soon be 40 years old.  The anniversary of entry into force next 
March will be a good moment to recommit States Parties to the regime of biological 
disarmament and to plan for its reinforcement, in particular for the decisions a well-
prepared Eighth Review Conference can take to remedy its weaknesses and 
reinforce its strengths.  The BWC can count on us in the academic and scientific 
professions and NGOs for support, sustained over many years; but by the nature of 
the treaty relationship it is ultimately for its States Parties as treaty partners to make 
it work. 
  
Mr Chairman, we wish you all a productive week and look forward to continuing our 
engagement with the Meetings of Experts and of States Parties in the service of the 
BWC. 
 
 
 
Mr Nicholas Sims 
Emeritus Reader in International Relations, London School of Economics & Political Science 
 
Dr Filippa Lentzos  
Senior Research Fellow, Department of Social Science, Health & Medicine, King’s College London 
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